Tom Steyer Snags Trump Web Domain

Tom Steyer’s presidential campaign acquired an early Christmas present on Cyber Monday. They were able to snag the domain name associated with President Trump’s re-election bid, “Keep America Great.”

The site, www.keepamericagreat.com, directs users to a sales page for a $1 Steyer bumper sticker that reads “Trump is a fraud & a failure.”

“Trump’s campaign prides itself on hoarding websites of political opponents, but they forgot to pick up the URL for their signature re-election slogan, ‘Keep America Great,’” Steyer’s campaign said in a statement.

It is unclear how much the domain cost the Steyer campaign, which did not immediately respond to a FOX Business request for comment.

Web records indicate the website was created on June 25, 2015. Trump did not officially announce his re-election campaign until early 2017, more than a year after the domain first launched.

The president has been known for taking the URLs of political opponents; in 2015, the Trump campaign bought JebBush.com, which redirected users to DonaldTrump.com. As recently as October, after former Vice President Joe Biden announced his Latino outreach initiative “Todos Con Biden,” Trump bought TodosConBiden.com.

“Oops, Joe forgot about Latinos,” the site reads. “Joe is all talk.”

Steyer, who’s worth $1.6 billion, according to Forbes, has not shied away from using his vast fortune to influence the Democratic primary.

The former hedge fund manager, who’s far wealthier than any other Democratic candidate except latecomer former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, has spent a staggering $30 million in TV and radio advertisements, according to ad-spending data from Advertising Analytics. The money is mostly concentrated in early voting states.

That amount is roughly seven times more than Trump’s campaign has spent on his re-election efforts.

What do you think about Steyer’s buying of the Trump slogan? We look forward to seeing your comments in the section just below this article.

When Should You Start Claiming Social Security?

For a number of Americans, taking Social Security benefits at 62 is not so much a choice, but more of a necessity. A large fraction of Social Security participants rely on the program for the majority of their income, and for some, their Social Security check is just about the only income they can count on each month.

Those who have managed to save up a healthy nest egg for retirement have more options. Delaying Social Security can be attractive, as it allows them to get larger monthly benefits later on, and often pass those higher checks on to their loved ones in the form of survivor benefits.

But there’s a choice that very few Social Security experts talk about — taking Social Security at 62 even if you don’t really need it, and investing your monthly benefits to generate additional returns.

Most people looking at Social Security concentrate on the total amount of money they are likely to get over the course of their lifetime. This is mostly because Social Security has argued that its benefit formula is designed to pay out roughly the same regardless of when you claim benefits. This assumes that you live to roughly your actuarial life expectancy.

This approach has created a breakeven analysis, which looks more closely at the impact of when you claim benefits.

If you just look at total dollars paid after adjusting for inflation, traditional breakeven analysis concludes that living through your late 70s or early 80s is the typical time at which delaying benefits starts to pay off.

But the problem with traditional breakeven analysis is that it doesn’t reflect the time value of money. That might not matter so much for the many retirees who need to spend their Social Security as soon as they get it, but for those who can invest their benefit checks, however, the time value of money makes a huge difference, because investing early benefit checks provides a longer time horizon for investment growth.

Even modest return assumptions can make a marked difference in your analysis of when to claim Social Security.

For those who do have the financial resources to invest their Social Security, considering the time value of money is a worthwhile exercise. You might not end up changing your claiming decision because of it. But in some cases, it can make a big different in your overall financial well-being in retirement.

Abdirahman Cirro’s Election and Its Regional Implications

The election of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, popularly known as “Cirro,” as the new President of the breakaway northwest regions of Somalia known as Somaliland has the potential to significantly impact the region’s conflicts and diplomatic relations. As the self-declared republic prepares for a transfer of power from outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi, observers are closely watching to see how the new administration will approach key issues such as the frozen war with the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn – Khatumo (SSC-K) and the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year.

President-elect Abdirahman Cirro’s background and political stance suggest that he may bring a fresh perspective to these challenges, potentially altering the dynamics of the region’s ongoing struggles and reshaping Somaliland’s relationships with its neighbors and the international community. However, the extent to which he will depart from the policies of his predecessor remains uncertain, as the new leader must navigate an array of political, economic, and security interests while also managing the expectations of Somaliland’s diverse constituencies.

A Rejection of Militarism and Unilateralism?

The outcome of Somaliland’s presidential election can be seen as a rejection of the confrontational and militaristic approach adopted by outgoing President Muse Bihi, particularly in relation to the SSC-K conflict and the pursuit of international recognition through unilateral agreements like the Ethiopia MoU. Bihi’s hardline stance on these issues, exemplified by his refusal to stop the shelling of Las Anod by Somaliland forces, may have ultimately cost him the presidency, as voters grew weary of the human and economic costs of the frozen war and the diplomatic fallout from the MoU.

Abdirahman Cirro, in contrast, is seen as a less militaristic figure, unlike Muse Bihi who was a former colonel in the Somali army. His origins in the Sanaag region, which is claimed by both Somaliland and SSC-K, have also led some to perceive him as more sympathetic to the latter’s cause, raising hopes for a possible thaw in relations between the two sides. If Cirro proves willing to engage in dialogue and compromise with SSC-K, it could pave the way for a more peaceful and stable resolution to the long-running conflict, which has claimed countless lives and hindered development in the territories.

However, it is important to note that Abdirahman Cirro’s election does not necessarily represent a fundamental shift in Somaliland’s political orientation or a rejection of its secessionist aspirations. While he may adopt a more conciliatory approach to the SSC-K conflict, Cirro is unlikely to abandon Somaliland’s ultimate goal of international recognition and statehood, which remains a central pillar of the region’s political identity and national narrative.

The MoU Question

Perhaps the most significant and contentious issue facing President-elect Abdirahman Cirro is the fate of the MoU signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which grants the latter part of Somaliland’s sea in exchange for economic and political support. The agreement, which was championed by President Bihi as a means of securing international recognition for Somaliland, has been met with fierce opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and other regional actors, who view it as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Abdirahman Cirro’s stance on the MoU will be a key indicator of his foreign policy priorities and his approach to the question of Somaliland’s relationship with the rest of Somalia. On the one hand, the President-elect has expressed a greater openness to dialogue and engagement with the FGS than his predecessor, suggesting that he may be willing to explore a more cooperative and less confrontational path to resolving the status of Somaliland. This could involve a renegotiation or even a repudiation of the Ethiopia MoU, in exchange for concessions or guarantees from the FGS regarding Somaliland’s autonomy and political rights.

On the other hand, Cirro is a committed secessionist who has repeatedly affirmed his belief in Somaliland’s right to self-determination and statehood. As such, he may be reluctant to abandon the MoU entirely, seeing it as a valuable bargaining chip in Somaliland’s ongoing quest for international recognition. If Cirro chooses to continue pursuing the agreement, it could strain relations with the FGS and other regional actors, perpetuating the cycle of mistrust and antagonism that has characterized Somaliland’s interactions with the FGS in recent years.

Ultimately, the President-elect will need to carefully weigh the potential risks and rewards of different approaches to the MoU question, taking into account the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and the shifting priorities of key international partners. By charting a course that balances Somaliland’s aspirations for recognition with the need for regional stability and cooperation, Cirro may be able to unlock new opportunities for dialogue and compromise, while also safeguarding the interests of the people he represents.

Source orogin: thesomalidigest.com

FGS Criminalizes Jubaland Leader and Arms Clan Militias, Escalating Conflict

The Cabinet of Ministers, chaired by Prime Minister Hamza Barre, has declared that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has the sole legitimacy to hold elections at every level in the country, citing the controversial and non-inclusive constitutional changes made in March of this year. The cabinet’s statement, which effectively criminalizes the recently re-elected President of Jubaland, Ahmed Madobe, and refers his case to the Attorney General, represents a dangerous escalation in the ongoing conflict between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) and threatens to plunge the region into a new cycle of violence and instability.

The FGS’s latest move comes amidst reports that it has been actively recruiting local clan militias in Jubaland, particularly those affiliated with General Sahal Abdullahi Omar “Khalid,” who was appointed earlier this month as head of the Land Forces in anticipation of worsening relations with Madobe following his departure from the National Consultative Council (NCC). The deployment of these militias, coupled with the criminalization of Madobe and the FGS’s claim to exclusive electoral authority, suggests that the federal government has chosen the path of violent confrontation over dialogue and compromise, a deeply concerning development that risks further fracturing the already fragile Somali state.

The Controversial Constitutional Changes and Their Implications

The cabinet’s claim to sole electoral legitimacy is based on the controversial constitutional changes that were pushed through by the FGS in March of this year, without the participation or consent of key stakeholders such as Puntland and Jubaland. These changes, which were widely seen as an attempt by the FGS to centralize power and extend its mandate, have been a major source of tension and conflict between the federal government and the FMS, and have been rejected by many as unconstitutional and illegitimate.

By invoking these changes to justify its claim to exclusive electoral authority, the FGS is setting a dangerous precedent that could have far-reaching implications for the country’s political future. If the FGS is allowed to unilaterally impose its will on the FMS and dictate the terms of Somalia’s electoral process, it will effectively render the federal system meaningless and pave the way for a return to the kind of centralized, authoritarian rule that has long plagued the country and plunged it into civil war.

Moreover, by criminalizing Ahmed Madobe and referring his case to the Attorney General, the FGS is sending a clear message that it will not tolerate any challenge to its authority, no matter how legitimate or widely supported. This attempt to silence and intimidate one of Somalia’s most influential and respected regional leaders is a deeply troubling sign of the FGS’s growing authoritarian tendencies and its willingness to use any means necessary to maintain its grip on power.

The Recruitment of Clan Militias

Perhaps even more alarming than the FGS’s claim to exclusive electoral authority is its reported recruitment of local clan militias in Jubaland, particularly those affiliated with General Sahal Abdullahi Omar “Khalid.” The deployment of these militias in Ras Kamboni represents a significant escalation in the conflict between the FGS and Jubaland and threatens to plunge the region into a new cycle of violence and instability.

The use of clan militias by the FGS is a deeply cynical and dangerous tactic that exploits Somalia’s complex clan dynamics and risks further fragmenting the already fragile social fabric of the country. By arming and empowering these militias, the FGS is not only undermining the authority and legitimacy of the formal security forces but also creating a parallel security structure that is beholden to the interests of particular clans and individuals rather than the Somali state as a whole.

Moreover, the recruitment of these militias suggests that the FGS has already decided to pursue a policy of violent confrontation with Jubaland, rather than seeking a peaceful and negotiated solution to the current crisis. This is a deeply troubling development that risks further entrenching the divisions and grievances that have long fueled conflict and instability in Somalia, and could lead to a wider conflagration that would be devastating for the entire region.

Source origin: thesomalidigest.com

Somalia, US and UAE relations telltale of suspicions

In February this year, Somali judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf was elected the president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A few weeks later, the US fired its Secretary of State Rex Tillerson while he was on a tour of East Africa. This also came as the Somali parliament banned Emirate logistics firm DP World from operating in the country after it reportedly signed a port agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland against the wishes of Mogadishu’s one-Somalia policy.

INTERFERENCE
The three events appeared unrelated. But now they seem connected. Somalis say they yearn for a world where their country is helped to stand on its own feet without interference, and the election of their man to the top UN court was a pointer to this.

“His appointment comes at a time when the world needs a fair and proactive advocate for justice,” said Abdirahman Abdishakur, a Somali politician – once a development minister – and who signed the controversial border MoU with Kenya (the genesis of the dispute case now before the ICJ). For Somalia, however, the election of Justice Yusuf seemed to have done little to soothe its troubles.

REFORMS
In the past four months, the country trying to rise from years of violence, seemed to have been torn between its own political differences, and perceived external interference. In March, Somali legislators threatened to move a motion of no confidence in their Speaker Mohamed Jawari, accusing him of stalling the constitutional reforms meant to fully implement the country’s federal system and universal suffrage in the next few years.

The MPs may have had a reason to do this, but Mr Abdishakur thinks it fuelled further chaos in the country. “The political crisis is likely to deepen and no one can claim victory. There is no quick resolution on the horizon. The country is in a deep crisis, which probably makes the standoff intractable, setting the stage for more motions of impeachment,” he argued.

“Sophisticated Somali leadership is the sine qua non (the much needed item) of complicated causes of local conflict and renewed geopolitical competition in the region which require complicated solutions. It seems that we lack the former while the latter is getting worse.” The country, currently secured by the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom), plans to police itself by 2020, but requires a new constitution, to defeat Al-Shabaab, create stable systems and start building roads.

PAYOUTS
But here is where the perceived external interference comes in. On April 9, Mr Jawari quit his job, following a month-long standoff with MPs. A day earlier, Somali airport authorities in Mogadishu had confiscated some $9.6 million (Sh960 million) cash in transit from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), believed to be headed for payouts to politicians to save the Speaker.

“It has been a longstanding Western policy to keep Somalia impoverished and destabilised and they have found in the UAE a reliable agent to achieve their aims,” said Dr Abdiwahab Abdi, an analyst on Horn of Africa affairs with SouthLink Consultants. “The UAE is working on a two-pronged policy in Somalia and neighbouring countries. It is helping its western allies to secure their neocolonial aims in the region while furiously advancing its own vital economic interests.”

The UAE maintained the money was to pay the soldiers stationed in Somalia, and has gone on to suspend its military aid to Somalia in protest. But officials believed otherwise.
“There was suspicion that the money was meant to influence the motion and have the Speaker stay, despite the complaints he has had with MPs. This is a matter under investigation and we will probably have those questions answered,” a Somali Foreign ministry official told the Nation in anonymity as he is not authorised to speak to journalists.

“Somalia and the Emirates traditionally enjoy cordial relations and their investments here have been in what I call priority areas. The problem has been with UAE’s aggression in dealing with Somaliland, using DP World (a Dubai-based company),” the official explained.

DP WORLD
DP World had signed an agreement to use the Somaliland Port of Berbera. In March, Ethiopia acquired 19 percent stake in the port for $80 million. DP World owned 51 percent of the stake. But Somali MPs nullified the agreement, saying it violated territorial integrity (UAE Foreign Minister Dr Anwar Gargash later told the BBC his country only recognises one Somalia).

Until recently, UAE had been one of Somalia’s main donors, setting up a hospital in Mogadishu, training Somali soldiers and sending in relief to stranded IDPs. Between 1993 and 2016, it sent $277 million worth of aid to Somalia and another $165 million indirectly through charity promotions, according to their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

QATAR CRISIS
But in June 2017, the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain imposed a blockade on Qatar, closing land, sea and border with the tiny oil producing nation. Somalia got itself in the mix as the Middle East countries pressured it to drop alliance with Qatar. President Mohamed Farmajo declined and his country went ahead to sign a $200 million financing deal with Doha meant to refurbish government buildings, construct two city roads and build some schooling facilities.

US President Donald Trump initially supported the blockade, arguing terror supporters must be called out. His then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, however, embarked on a mediation effort, which the Emiratis did not like as they preferred stringent measures to force Qatar to cut off connections with Iran.

When Tillerson did not relent, Emiratis reportedly used lobbyists to campaign for his sacking, according to a recent report by the BBC which obtained emails detailing the lobbying. Somalia remained in the middle. However, the US government rejected accusations it is part of an international campaign to interfere with Somalia, with Robyn Mack, a spokesman for the US Africa Command, insisting its only intention is to wipe out terrorists.

Jubbaland24,
News Desk
Source: Daily Nation (Kenya)

No Agreement Reached in Kenya and Somalia Border Dispute

Johannesburg – Despite the intervention of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Kenya and Somalia have failed to settle a maritime border dispute which has spiked diplomatic tensions between them. Mogadishu will instead wait for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on the dispute as opposed to Nairobi’s demand for an out-of-court settlement and reversion to a map agreeable to both sides, the Business Daily reported.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo and Ahmed arrived in the Kenyan capital Nairobi on Tuesday night for talks with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta but endeavours to resolve the dispute failed. Kenya released no details of the discussions and nor was a joint communiqué issued.

The maritime border dispute has been simmering for years, negatively impacting relations between the two countries. On February 16 Kenya recalled its ambassador to Somalia and Mogadishu subsequently followed suit by recalling its own ambassador. Despite the inability of the two sides to resolve the dispute following Wednesday’s talks Farmajo’s spokesman Abdinur Mohamed Ahmed said the leaders had agreed to send their respective envoys back as a way of “restoring relations”.

According to a 2014 Somali suit filed with the ICJ at the Hague, Kenya has encroached on its 100,000 square-kilometre marine territory in the Indian ocean which holds possible oil and gas deposits. Mogadishu’s lawsuit followed six years of unsuccessful bilateral negotiations over the issue. Nairobi asserts that the marine boundary is determined by a parallel line of latitude to the east, as per the standards set by the colonial powers, which were adopted in the marine borders between Kenya and Tanzania, Tanzania and Mozambique and Mozambique and South Africa.

Mogadishu contends that the boundary extends to the south-east as an extension of the land border. This would incorporate a large swathe of what Kenya considers its Exclusive Economic Zone.

Despite their ongoing dispute, the two countries are inter-dependent with the Somali economy reliant on Kenya’s while Somalia is a major market for Kenyan goods.

Jubbaland24,
News Desk
Source: African News Agency (ANA)